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Abstract After the fall of communism in the Soviet Union, newspapers, films,
academic researchers and intelligence agencies warned against a new phenomenon
in organized crime: the “Russian mafiya.” In fact, since the fall of the Berlin Wall,
Western European countries have noted an increase in the number of criminals from
Central and Eastern Europe. In the mid-1990s, the Dutch judicial authorities made
the issue a priority and established a special team to investigate crime with links to
Eastern Europe. From 1999 to 2005, the KT NON crime team published several
studies and reports on serious crime of this nature. In this paper, the authors, who
were assigned to the KT NON crime team, discuss the findings of the two most
recent publications on the “causes, nature, scale and threat of Central and Eastern
European crime” and “mobile banditry,” respectively. They come to the conclusion
that among other forms of crime, the phenomenon of mobile banditry seems to be
the most serious manifestation of crime from post-communist countries. The Russian
mafia was not found.
Keywords RussianMafia Central . Eastern European Criminals . Netherlands .
Banditry
Introduction
After the fall of communism in the Soviet Union in 1991, a new phenomenon in
organized crime made the headlines: the “Russian Mafia.” Films and newspapers
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depicted this mafia as a terrible beast bent on world domination with the help of the
former Soviet Union’s nuclear stockpiles.1 This alarming message was not limited to
films or sleazy tabloids in need of a scoop; academic researchers and intelligence
agencies also seemed genuinely disturbed. According to CIA testimony before US
Congress in 1997: “Russian organized crime has quickly become an international
menace, conducting operations far beyond the Russian borders and reaching even
our own shores” (Washington Times, July 25, 1997). In a similar vein, Galeotti
discusses the “boundless ambition” of this Russian “mafiya”2:
The Russian mafiya is an expansionist force and has gone beyond merely
preying on Russian expatriates and émigrés abroad. There is a strong mafiya
presence in the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Poland, but it has gone
much further. Under the brutal and effective vor v zakone Ivan’kov, it has taken
control of the émigré Russian gangs of New York’s Brighton Beach. From there
it has built a North American Organizatsiya that includes five major cartels,
comprising 200 gangs in 17 cities, most notably in New York, Chicago, Los
Angeles, San Francisco, Denver, and Miami. The mafiya has even established a
series of national “prefects” in Canada, Crete (a major mafiya laundry), Greece,
Austria (a particular favorite of the vory v zakone), Germany, the Low
Countries, Israel and the former Yugoslavia ... The Russian mafiya has thus
become a player in international criminal circles (Galeotti 1996, p.19).
Galeotti characterizes Russian organized crime as being highly organized with
“national prefects” in several countries, including supposedly the Low Countries. In
fact, by the mid-1990s, the Dutch judicial authorities identified organized crime from
Eastern Europe as a priority and established a team to focus on investigating crime
from this “area of attention.” Originally called the Interregionaal Rechercheteam
Noord- en Oost-Nederland (IRT NON), this organized crime investigation team was
later renamed Kernteam Noord- en Oost-Nederland (KT NON).3 In the 5-year
period from 1992 to 1997, at least a dozen Eastern Europeans were assassinated in
the Netherlands. In addition, the growing number of prostitutes and car thieves from
former Eastern Bloc countries alarmed Dutch authorities. Striving for “intelligence-
led policing,” the team also consisted of academic researchers who were to write
studies on specific topics like human trafficking and broad crime pattern analyses
(CBAs),4 strategic assessments of the causes, nature, scale and “threat”; of crime in
2For a similar assessment, see CSIS (1997). For a critical discussion of these studies and of CSIS (2000),
see Weenink (2001).
3Teams for other areas were established as well, including organized crime related to Turkey, organized
crime related to Latin America, human smuggling, financial crime, synthetic drugs, Amsterdam Airport
Schiphol, Port of Rotterdam and Dutch criminal networks.
4CBA is the Dutch acronym for criminaliteitsbeeldanalyse (crime pattern analysis).
1See, for example, the James Bond film GoldenEye (1995).
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and from the area of attention.5 Organized crime from Central and Eastern Europe
was prioritized in the Netherlands until 2004, when the areas of attention were all
redefined in terms of criminal activities. By that time, the team’s authors, together
with strategic analysts from the police, had published several reports on Eastern
European organized crime.6 The decision to lift the prioritized status from crime
from Central and Eastern Europe was not explicitly motivated by an assumed lack of
threat from that region. After all, by 1 May 2004 some observers expected the threat
to increase due to the accession of eight former communist countries to the EU. This
gave rise to the following questions: How extensive was crime from the former
communist countries? In light of the anxiety of the mid-1990s, in particular, to what
extent had something akin to a Russian mafia as described by Galeotti gained a
foothold in Dutch society?
In this paper, the authors, who were assigned as researchers to the crime team,
discuss these issues by presenting the team’s findings. The central question to be
answered is whether these findings confirm the perception of the mid-1990s that the
Netherlands was facing a serious threat of organized crime from Central and Eastern
Europe. In other words, did that threat materialize? To address this, the central
question is divided into sub-questions, which we will try to respond to in the
sections below:
1. How many criminals from Central and Eastern European countries were active
in the Netherlands in the period from 1996 to 2005? From which countries did
they come?
2. To what extent were these criminals involved in “organized crime,” “corporate
crime,” and “banditry”?
3. How violent were Central and Eastern European criminals?
In responding to these questions, we draw on all publications by the team on
Central and Eastern European crime, focusing particularly on the two most recently
published reports, viz. “Crime without frontiers” (2004) and the 2005 study on
“mobile banditry” from Poland and Lithuania.7 The answer to the first question
mainly concerns statistics on the number of registered suspects from the area of
attention who came to the Netherlands in the 1996–2002 period, as discussed in
“Crime without frontiers,” and supplemented with more recent figures for the 2003–
6In 1999, 2000, 2002 and 2004, the team published the following CBAs: KT NON 1999; KT NON 2000;
KT NON 2002 and KLPD/DNR 2004. The team also published specialized studies on human trafficking,
extortion, auto theft and lorry hijacking in Russia. In 2005, a final report on mobile banditry from Poland
and Lithuania was published (KLPD/DNR 2005).
7“Crime without frontiers was written by Anton Weenink, Franca van der Laan and Sander Huisman”; was
also published in English.
5Initially, the team’s area of attention was “Eastern Europe”, which was defined as the territory of the 15
successor states of the former Soviet Union. In 2003, Central Europe was included as well. “Central
Europe” was defined as the territory of the former communist countries that were to join the European
Union in 2004: the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. The Baltic states (Estonia,
Latvia and Lithuania), being former Soviet republics, were already part of the area of attention. The
territory of the former German Democratic Republic was not included. The area of attention also did not
include the former communist countries of Southeastern Europe, viz. the successor states of former
Yugoslavia (excluding Slovenia), Bulgaria, Rumania, and Albania.
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2005 period that were quickly available. The second question focuses on whether we
were actually dealing with “organized crime” or with other ways in which criminals
“organize” their activities. The use of violence is often seen as a characteristic aspect
of “organized crime” and of the Russian “mafiya” in particular. The violent nature of
crimes can be assessed quite directly using crime statistics and our qualitative
analysis.
Definitions
In “Crime without frontiers,” the CBA on Central and Eastern European organized
crime for the 2002–2003 period, we took an “upside down approach” to concepts and
data collection. As the task was to draft a CBA on Eastern European “organized
crime,” we could not simply leave it to our “information suppliers” to define this
concept. Rather than focus only on criminal files that had already been qualified by
investigators as “organized crime,” all data on serious offences committed by Eastern
Europeans and on individual subjects were collected from the 25 Dutch police districts
and from specialist investigative agencies. By pooling and analyzing these data, we
tried to assess which relationships existed between criminals. We referred to cases
involving at least two criminals in one or more crimes as “combinations of suspects.”
We then considered whether the “combinations of suspects” identified could be
deemed “organized crime,” “corporate crime” or “banditry.”
As existing definitions did not delineate these concepts, we had to invent our
own.8 In our approach, “organized crime” was defined as crime on illegal markets
and primarily involving wholesale trade, in which quantities of illegal goods are
bought with a view to selling and not consumption.9 “Banditry” referred to groups
involved in property crimes. “Corporate crime” was defined as crime committed by
administrators of legal organizations.10
This method of collecting data on suspects resulted in a much larger data set
than would have been possible had we relied on investigation files on “organized
crime,” that were selected according to more conventional (and vague) definitions.
Despite this fact, the data proved to be anything but complete and the quality left
8Many criminologists seem to have difficulty in realizing that a definition is not the same as a description.
They are not to be assessed by their empirical validity, but rather by their usefulness.
9The exact definition of “organized crime” was: “The combinations of suspects that commit two or more
offences on illegal markets that are punishable by four years or more of imprisonment are included in
organized crime” (KLPD/DNR 2004, p. 33).
10In a more recent approach that refines the definition applied in “Crime without frontiers”, we redraw
boundaries somewhat. “Organized crime” entails “trade crime” (crime on illegal markets) and ‘banditry”.
In “trade crime” we tend to include one-man businesses as well. The “combinations of suspects” active as
independent buyer or seller can be considered “criminal enterprises” (Van Duyne et al. 2006). Any
wholesale buyer or seller in illegal markets, whether a “group person” or not, is considered to be active in
“trade crime”. We make a distinction between “crime enterprises” and “criminal trading networks”, which
we define as the collection of all enterprises that, in some specified way, conduct business on illegal
markets. To avoid confusing levels of analysis, individual members of crime enterprises consisting of two
or more people are not considered members of these “networks”. Networks refer specifically to the parties
to specific transactions (i.e. enterprises whether they are one-man businesses or not).
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much to be desired. Consequently, we refrained from making quantitative
statements on the development of “organized crime” based on our own data. For
this, we used standardized data from the HKS11 registry. This information,
however, did not lend itself to establishing relations between suspects. We used the
data set as a means of gaining a more complete picture and applied our concepts
quite informally.12 We did use the findings to call attention to a particular form of
banditry, which we termed “mobile banditry.” This refers to offender groups
involved in cross-border “hit-and-run” property crimes. “Mobile banditry” was
addressed in a follow-up to the CBA and will be discussed in a separate section
below (KLPD/DNR 2005).
How many criminals? Where did they come from?
A graph showing the development of the number of registered suspects in the
Netherlands who were born in the area of attention would suggest that the situation was
deteriorating quickly. In the decade from 1996 to 2005, the number of suspects from
Central European countries more than doubled while those from Soviet successor
states tripled. The growing number of criminals largely corresponded with similar
increases in the number of migrants to the Netherlands from these countries. The
team’s findings, however, indicated that the relative share of criminals from post-
communist countries remained modest. There were also indications that a significant
number of the suspects still lived in their country of origin and so were not part of the
expanding immigrant communities. Moreover, we found no sound reasons to expect
that EU-enlargement would lead to a major increase in crime from newMember States.
Numbers of suspect by native country
Table 1 shows that the number of suspects from the former Soviet Union in the HKS
police registry13 more than tripled from 592 in 1996 to 2,068 in 2002. This was equal
to l.16% of the total number of suspects (178,094).14 The information we collected
from other sources (e.g. police registries and what is known as the GRIP registry,
which contains data on detainees in Dutch prisons) suggests a fairly consistent pattern.
12The new approach led to a bulky file consisting of some 15,000 records on suspects, victims, other
persons and the offences in which they were involved. Although the data did not allow quantitative
statements, it did complement other sources. We pooled data from the NRI (National Criminal Intelligence
Service), data from the Eastern Europe Department and other Dutch and foreign partners.
13HKS registration does not imply that criminal prosecutions against the subjects were initiated. KT NON
(1999, p.68) contains HKS figures from 1991 to 1997. At the time, HKS registration was not up to
standard (i.e. several districts did not register properly). Comparison of these figures with those presented
in this report might be misleading.
11HKS is the Dutch acronym for Herkenningsdienstsysteem (Suspects Identification System). It contains
files on persons charged with committing a crime and data on persons who were arrested as suspects on
the basis of some form of documentation.
14As suspects are registered according to native country, HKS-data do not always indicate the Soviet
successor states from which they came. This is also the case with Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia
(countries which have broken up as well).
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Suspects and detainees from former Soviet republics are usually Russians and
Lithuanians, followed by suspects born in the three Caucasus republics (Armenia,
Azerbaijan and Georgia), Ukraine and Belarus. Estonia, Latvia and the five Central
Asian republics are hardly represented in police data on Eastern European crime.
In the 1996–2002 period, the number of suspects born in Central Europe
(Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia) doubled to almost 1,500. This was
equal to 0.81% of the total number of suspects. Although the Balkan Peninsula was
not included in the area of attention, for the sake of comparison, the CBA also
contained figures on the number of suspects from Southeastern Europe (Albania,
Bulgaria, Rumania and the successor states of former Yugoslavia, excluding
Slovenia). In total, 2,764 suspects came from the Balkans (1.55% of the total number
of suspects). A limited increase can largely be attributed to growth in the number of
Bulgarian suspects. Two-thirds (1,904) of suspects from the Balkan were born in the
former Yugoslav republics. These figures put former Yugoslavia in fifth place and the
former Soviet Union in sixth, after Suriname, Morocco, the Dutch Antilles and
Turkey, as countries of origin of suspects who were not born in the Netherlands.
More recent figures from Statistics Netherlands (“CBS”) show an increase in
2003 to 2,604 suspects from the former USSR, followed by a moderate decline in
2005 to 2,511. In 2005, criminals born in the former Soviet Union accounted for less
than 1.1% of all suspects registered. The number of Polish suspects nearly doubled
from 1,245 in 2002 to 2,327 in 2005. Growth as a percentage of total suspects was
less pronounced (0.7% in 2002 to 1% in 2005).15 We have no recent data on the
Table 1 Registered suspects in HKS according to native country 1996–2002, resident in the Netherlands
and elsewhere








169,858 161,796 170,084 162,434 154,055 168,616 178,094 100
Former Soviet-
Union
592 660 734 1,244 1,582 1,998 2,068 1.16 349
Central Europe
Hungary 68 77 77 77 63 63 59 0.03 87
Poland 616 698 734 694 676 932 1,245 0.70 202
Former
Czechoslovakia
69 77 86 86 131 146 133 0.07 193
Total Central
Europe
753 852 897 857 870 1,141 1,437 0.81 191
South Eastern Europe
Albania 46 82 97 74 67 109 131 0.07 285
Bulgaria 35 45 46 47 97 181 406 0.23 1,160
Romania 168 142 162 197 152 196 323 0.18 192
Former
Yugoslavia
2,160 1,890 2,267 2,275 1,806 2,021 1,904 1.07 88
Total South
Eastern Europe
2,409 2,159 2,572 2,593 2,222 2,507 2,764 1.55 115
Source: KLPD/DNRI (HKS)
15In 2005, the total number of suspects in the Netherlands was 235,707.
62 Trends Organ Crim (2007) 10:57–76
other Central European countries. Their numbers in terms of a percentage of total
suspects should be fairly marginal. The CBA showed that in 2002 Polish suspects
accounted for 85% of all suspects from Central Europe.16 The relatively high
number of Polish suspects can be explained by the fact that there are simply more
Poles than Czechs or Hungarians in the country and that Poland is relatively closer
to the Netherlands when compared to Hungary or Slovenia.
Although numbers do not always indicate the seriousness of the problem, it is
obvious that the Netherlands has not quite been overtaken by a flood of criminals
from Central and Eastern Europe. The picture becomes even less disturbing when
one looks at the numbers as a percentage of the total number of crimes committed.
Table 2 shows that in 2002, Polish suspects, who made up 0.7% of all suspects,
accounted for 0.23% of crimes committed. Suspects from the former Soviet Union,
who accounted for 0.96% of all suspects, accounted for only 0.43% of all crimes. On
average, criminals from the area of attention committed fewer crimes than other
criminals.
Demographic developments
According to CBS figures, the growth in the number of suspects was mirrored by the
increase in the number of migrants from the area of attention. In the 1996–2003
period, the number of persons from the former Soviet Union who settled in the
Netherlands tripled to 40,000. The number of migrants from Central Europe
increased by one-third to 56,000. It cannot be ruled out—in fact, it is highly
probable—that the growth in the number of migrants to some extent explains the
growth in the number of suspects. Nevertheless, caution is advised here. First, more
Table 2 Number of registered crimes according to native country, 2002






Former Soviet-Union 6,125 0.43 2,068 2.96
Former Czechoslovakia 375 0.03 133 2.82
Hungary 258 0.02 59 4.37
Poland 3,330 0.23 1,245 2.67
Albania 493 0.03 131 3.76
Bulgaria 740 0.05 406 1.82
Romania 1,421 0.10 323 4.40
Former Yugoslavia 10,146 0.72 1,904 5.33
HKS Total 1,418,376 – 178,094 7.96
Source: KLPD/DNRI (HKS)
16From 1996 to 2002, the number of suspects from former Czechoslovakia doubled to 133. Recent CBS
figures on Rumania and Bulgaria, which both joined the EU in 1997, had risen relatively sharply until
2002 (after visa requirements had been lifted). Total numbers, however, have remained fairly low, even
decreasing in the 2003–2005 period (from 486 to 353 Romanian suspects and from 440 to 375 Bulgarian
suspects).
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than half of the Polish suspects in 2002 did not live in the Netherlands. This could
involve crimes involving seasonal workers, who are not included in the figures on
migrants as they are issued a work permit valid for a few months. Second, it is likely
that a significant share of crime by non-resident Poles can be attributed to “mobile
banditry” (see below). Third, some observers have indicated that there is little
evidence that the immigrants from the various countries of the area of attention form
distinct communities. Central and Eastern European immigrants go their own ways
without involving themselves with former countrymen who also live in the
Netherlands. There is no reason to believe that there is an expanding “community
of immigrants” that provides some kind of cover or bridge for the crooks in their
midst. One factor to be noted is that up to 60% of all immigrants are women. In
many cases, these women are married to a Dutchman and are not involved in any
criminal activity whatsoever (KLPD/DNR 2004, p.123).
The effect of EU enlargement
As the title of the CBA (“Crime without frontiers”) suggests, it focused particular
attention on the expected effect of EU enlargement involving a number of former
communist countries. Looking back, it might have been better to put a question mark
at the end. In fact, the CBA questioned the assumption many seemed to entertain
that the number of criminals from the eight accession countries was to grow
significantly after l May 2004. First, the new Member States did not immediately
join the Schengen area (free passenger travel) on l May 2004 because border control
at the new external border at the time did not comply with EU standards. Existing
control mechanisms were to remain in force and would only be dropped when the
European Council had taken a positive decision about it. This decision would be
based on an assessment of the state of readiness to implement the entire Schengen
package. Second, for years, trends have shown that criminals from Central and
Eastern Europe are acquainted with enough ways to quickly get into, move around
within and leave the EU via green borders, by means of false or forged travel
documents, or with a valid passport (as there is no visa requirement). As far as the
development of crime is concerned, the discontinuation of visa regimes had more of
an effect than EU enlargement was probably going to have. Border control is an
important means of tracking down criminals, but it will not stop them. The picture
becomes less optimistic when one looks at the effect of enlargement on smuggling.
As the new Member States were also to join the Customs Union (free movement of
goods), the CBA expected that smuggling goods from the new Member States to the
existing Member States would become easier on l May 2004. Finally, a third reason
why the CBA was not very pessimistic about the consequences of EU enlargement
was the improved cooperation with the eight new Member States’ police services in
preparation for accession.
Because crime from Central and Eastern Europe was no longer an area of
attention of the National Crime Squad in the Netherlands after 2004, we have not
been able to establish very thoroughly whether our expectations materialized,
particularly with regard to the smuggling of goods. The number of criminals from
Poland grew rapidly in 2004. It is difficult to assess the effect of accession. Growth
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had already started in 2001 and decelerated again in 2005.17 It may simply be too
early to tell to what extent EU enlargement has affected the number of criminals.
The acceleration in growth observed in 2004 was probably related to increasing
employment opportunities for Polish seasonal workers, which is a consequence of
EU enlargement. Despite this fact, the number of Polish criminals remains
limited, demonstrated by the fact that they only make up 1% of all suspects in
the Netherlands. Furthermore, CBS data show that in 2005 the average number of
crimes per suspect from Poland decreased from 2.7 to 1.5 per capita. This figure
indicates that growth in the number of criminals from Poland does not imply higher
levels of crime resulting from their activities.18 In as far as conclusions can be
drawn from available data, we tend to uphold our assessment that EU
enlargement in 2004 did not significantly affect the overall crime levels in the
Netherlands.
After the fall of the Iron Curtain, the Netherlands was not flooded with Central
and Eastern European criminals. An increase in the number of suspects could only
be expected, as levels in 1989 were almost nil. We should not jump to
conclusions, however. From a policy perspective, it does not automatically follow
that “there is no problem with Central and Eastern European crime and no special
measures need to be taken.” The need for special measures would depend on the
types of crimes suspects were committing and particularly on the issue of whether
“post-communist crime” exhibits specific characteristics demanding a tailored
response.
“Organized crime,” “corporate crime” and “banditry”
Now we turn to the data set we collected for the CBA and the casuistry of the KT
NON team. As said, the quality of data in our set proved too poor to identify
unambiguously groups that were hitherto not seen, which had been one of our
aims. Our approach did help us to draw up a more complete picture. Some
specialized agencies we received data from, had missed cases we did receive from
other sources. Of course, we do not know how many cases never came to our
attention.19
18KLPD/DNR (2004, p.134) and CBS crime data 2003–2005. The data did not contain the total number of
crimes in 2005.
19The set consisted of more than 15,000 records on suspects, victims and other persons somehow
“involved” in cases in which there was a tie with Central and Eastern Europe. Groups and types of crime
were established using data and information from research reports, press releases and scientific research.
For each type of offence the possible offender groups (combinations of suspects) were studied as well as
the countries of origin of the suspects and victims, if available. The offender groups in question were
subsequently categorized as having been involved in banditry, organized crime or corporate crime. For a
more detailed account of our approach, please consult “Crime without frontiers”.
17HKS data show that in the 1996–2000 period, the number of Polish suspects rose by 10%, 38% in 2001,
34% in 2002, 18% in 2003 18% and 45% in 2004. In 2005, the rate suddenly returned to 10% (HKS data
from KLPD/DNR 2004, p.128) and CBS data. In KLPD/DNR (2005, p.55), we present the HKS data as
they were in 2005; the CBS data were published in 2006 and differ slightly from the HKS data. HKS
reports 2,121 suspects in 2004, whereas the CBS counts 2,116 suspects. This is probably due to
corrections made to the original HKS data set.
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We used the file and the casuistry to determine the extent to which criminals
cooperated in “combinations of suspects” to commit acts that could be classified as
“organized crime,” “banditry” and “corporate crime.” We first discuss organized
crime: To what extent did we encounter combinations of suspects that were involved
in or facilitating the buying and selling wholesale quantities of illegal goods on
illegal markets?20 We then focus on “corporate crime,” which by and large concerns
possible instances of financial service providers that seemed to assist in the
laundering of money flows of Russian entities. We then discuss the issue of
‘banditry,” “mobile banditry” in particular. For this discussion, we refer to the report
on mobile gangs from Poland and Lithuania.
Organized crime: Central and Eastern European criminals on illegal markets
The findings largely confirm the team’s previous view of Central and Eastern
European activity on illegal markets. In 1999, following large-scale research, the
team concluded that Eastern Europeans were active in auto theft, but not always in
an organized fashion. Traffickers in women seemed to be somewhat more organized,
but there were no large criminal “organizations” active in this field. Eastern
European criminals were completely absent in arms trafficking. They were also not
heavily involved in the trade of narcotic drugs in the Netherlands (KT NON 1999).
Below is a brief overview of the findings in “Crime without frontiers.” For a detailed
account, please refer to the report.
& Narcotic drugs
The 1999 study, 2000 and 2002 follow-up reports and “Crime without frontiers”
all left the impression that criminals from the area of attention were mainly active as
buyers on drug markets. Dutch police have not found cases of criminals from the
area of attention acting as wholesale suppliers of non-synthetic narcotic drugs.
Nevertheless the number of cases of drug trafficking seemed to grow. It was
difficult, however, to come to a definitive assessment since many of the files
received did not specify the type of drugs involved. We received files on 36
combinations of suspects involving narcotics-related offences in 2002–2003. Eleven
of these came from one regional district and concerned soft drugs and involved
Central European seasonal workers who were hired by illegal hemp farmers.
The team’s casuistry included five instances of cocaine being transported from
Latin America to the area of attention. Several Central and Eastern Europeans
involved in cocaine smuggling by air as mules and couriers have been caught, but
20Initially we tried to collect data on all “serious” crime (i.e. crime punishable by four or more years of
imprisonment) involving Central and Eastern Europeans. However, we received data on almost anything.
We filtered those cases involving two or more persons committing crime on illegal markets and tried to
assess when this was a case of trade in high volumes of contraband. Data from other sources would
sometimes provide additional understanding of cases that seemed to demand special attention in this
respect. We do not think our approach will win awards and have to be very modest about the robustness of
our findings. Nevertheless, we do think that it was conceptually sound compared to other approaches and
that it did give us a broad picture of what was going on with regard to crime from the area of attention.
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not on a large scale. We concluded that the picture concerning cocaine smuggling
gave no cause for concern, although some alertness was required.
Information from liaison officers and open sources suggested that drug abuse,
heroin use in particular, in Eastern Europe was growing rapidly. There were no
indications, however, that heroin from the Netherlands had been exported to Eastern
Europe, as the region is probably directly supplied from Central Asia. The police
were not aware of any cases in which heroin was imported from the area of attention.
This was at odds with a hypothesis put forward by a Western European police
agency that Eastern European heroin smugglers were developing an alternative to
the Balkan Route, known as the “Silk Route,” which ran from Central Asia through
Russia to Northwestern Europe. Although the KT NON found no seizures that could
substantiate this claim, a “northern route” might of course develop in the future.21
In the casuistry, offender groups from the area of attention did seem increasingly
active on the synthetic drug market, i.e. production of precursor substances and pills
in the Netherlands to be smuggled out of the country. One Lithuanian group
organized the production of XTC and was involved in at least one serious murder
case. There are cases involving Polish, Russian and Ukrainian criminals as well. In
most of these cases, Dutch citizens were also involved.
& Human trafficking
“Crime without frontiers” confirmed the findings of previous studies of a
continuous involvement of Central and Eastern Europeans in human trafficking with
ties to prostitution. This is, however, particularly true as regards the origin of the
victims. Offender groups came from the area of attention to a lesser extent. Such
groups, most of which consisted of two to five persons, included a mix of
nationalities. Women also showed up in the files as offenders. Dutch citizens were
almost always involved in one way or another. Although it did not belong to our
geographical area of interest, we did find a high and increasing involvement of
offenders from Bulgaria.
& Human smuggling
Although smuggling routes run across Central and Eastern Europe, criminals
from the area of attention were hardly involved in human smuggling into or via the
Netherlands. Central and Eastern European involvement in human smuggling did
not seem to go much further than their own national borders. There seemed to be
involvement of Czechs in the smuggling of Chinese en route to the United Kingdom.
This was the only case.
& Illegal trafficking of firearms
As firearms are not produced in the Netherlands, all weapons have to come from
abroad. Several countries in the area of attention are production centers. Although
the police have intercepted weapons produced in these areas, no involvement of
criminals from the area of attention trafficking firearms to the Netherlands has been
21It could be noted that the name “Silk Route” is not entirely appropriate. The “Silk Route” was the trail
from Central Asia to Antioch and Istanbul. The name more aptly describes the traditional route heroin
follows before reaching the Balkan route from Turkey into Europe. It is not an adequate name for a route
to Northwestern Europe.
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established. Since the 1990s, former Yugoslavs have been conspicuously active in
this area. It should be noted, however, that trade in firearms in the Netherlands has
never been big business. Of those arrested for illegal possession of firearms, only a
few were Central and Eastern Europeans.
& Cigarette smuggling
Since the 1990s, the crime team (and the Dutch customs authorities) identified
several cases of cigarette smuggling with ties to Central and Eastern Europe. In these
cases, the Netherlands functioned mainly as a transit country for cigarette smuggling
to the United Kingdom, where excise duties were much higher than on the continent.
KT NON 2002 discussed the findings of an analysis of several cases. The analysis
indicated that Dutch criminals who had previously been involved in drug trafficking
were active in cigarette smuggling. The conclusion also seemed justified that
cigarette smuggling in some cases involved investors from Russia, who probably
initiated smuggling lines, for instance, by acquiring a Dutch road transport firm.
Presenting an update of this study, “Crime without frontiers” confirms the
involvement of the area of attention in a number of cases.22 These numbers,
however, have decreased. Dutch offenders and companies were almost always
involved—as transporters, re-packers and administrators— in cases with ties to the
Netherlands. Lithuanian authorities informed the crime team that proceeds in pound
sterling had been found in their country, confirming the impression that cigarettes
traveled illegally from the Baltic region to the UK.
& Illegal trade in plants and animals23
There were indications that the Czech Republic plays a transit role in plant and
animal trafficking. Russia plays an important global role as a transit port, source
country and nowadays as a country of destination for endangered species as well.
Despite this fact, there is little case history on the illegal trade of plants and animals
in the Netherlands with links to the area of attention in the 2002–2003 period.
Limited quantities of endangered plants were smuggled from the Netherlands to the
Czech Republic in particular and of endangered species smuggled from the Czech
Republic and Russia to the Netherlands.
“Crime without frontiers” concluded that when it comes to organized crime—
defined as crime on illegal markets (wholesale markets in particular)—Eastern
European criminals are or have been active in synthetic drugs, human trafficking and
cigarette smuggling. It could not be established that these criminals were involved in
wholesale heroin or cocaine trafficking, human smuggling, arms trade or
environmental crimes.
22Dossiers received from Dutch customs authorities identified the following countries of origin: Poland
(12 dossiers), Lithuania (8 dossiers), Russia (6 dossiers) and Latvia (KLPD/DNR 2004, p.220).
23There is little information about environmental crime such as dumping waste. There have been incidents
involving the interception of radioactive scrap from the area of attention.
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Corporate crime: financial crime
Requests for legal assistance with regard to financial crime mainly involved a wide
range of fraud cases involving legal businesses active in the import and export of
goods and services. In short, these were cases of corporate crime. The team itself
collected 17 dossiers on financial crime. Six cases concerned suspicions of money
laundering, involving sometimes highly complex international money flows. Other
cases concerned investment (three dossiers),24 business transactions (five dossiers,
mainly involving false invoices) and only three dossiers related to illegal markets
(tobacco, XTC and two cocaine cases).
The team’s dossiers contained potentially interesting cases but in the end, the
investigations were never concluded due to their supposed complexity. In particular,
it proved difficult to obtain information from the Russian side on the origin of
money flows. Without such information, there was “no case.” Incompleteness of
data was a problem as well. According to the Office for the Disclosure of Unusual
Transactions (“MOT”), the number of unusual transactions with ties to the area of
attention was not excessive when compared to other geographical areas. Data,
however, were probably not very complete since reporting nationality is not a
standard part of registering unusual transactions. In addition, it is too easy to
circumvent the obligation to notify unusual giro transactions; the threshold is trans-
actions involving 4 million and more.
It could not be denied however that in the mid-1990s and later, there were a
number of cases of unusual money flows coming from the Russian Federation or
related to Russian businesses going through the Netherlands (and other countries, in
particular Cyprus, Switzerland). In 2000, one case involved suspicious transactions
conducted by several legal persons for large Russian companies, involving a total
amount of $200 million. Based on cases like this and information from open and
other sources, the problem was described as serious as there were clear indications
that financial service providers in the Netherlands were active in this field. However,
criminal proceedings were not initiated since it proved very difficult to retrieve
information on the underlying crime. The unusual nature of these financial
transactions was evident. So much was clear, but why and who was behind this?
The Russian mafia?
The crime team’s 1999 and 2002 reports discussed the origins of Russian flight
capital, suggesting that there was nothing particularly peculiar about capital fleeing
Russia or about the fact that export earnings of Russian firms were not being
repatriated. There seemed to be well-founded reasons for Russian businesses to get
their money out of the country. Russia’s investment climate was terrible due not only
to the activities of racketeers, but also to corruption, political turmoil and
24We definitely cannot rule out the possibility that some Russian “biznizmen”, criminal and non-criminal,
have bought real estate, but no data set is available indicating who owns property, where they come from
or which properties are involved. Field research by Siegel suggests that Russian business professionals
settle in the Netherlands to relax or offer their families safe haven (Siegel 2002).
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unpredictable, politicized taxation. For several years about $1.5 to 2 billion dollars a
month was being withdrawn from the Russian economy. It was not very plausible
that ordinary gangsters had the assets that could generate such vast amounts of
money. Allegations in CSIS (1997, p.25) and Galeotti (1996, p.6) that organized
crime groups acquired large stakes in Russia’s industries during privatization are not
convincing. Russia’s rapid voucher privatization of medium- and large-sized
enterprises (in 1992–1996) was very much closed to outsiders (Blasi et al. 1997,
p.119–120; Weenink and Correljé 1999). This goes a fortiori for the privatization of
Russia’s key industrial sectors—the energy and natural resource sectors—that were
divvied up among a small group of bankers, who subsequently created what
became known as Financial Industrial Groups. In 1992 the energy sector generated
more than half of Russian GDP and its share rose in the following years when
production in manufacturing industries collapsed. In fact, the manufacturing
industries destroyed value.25 Russia’s primary industries were the generators of
export earnings, these industries are the most likely sources of flight capital
(Loungani and Mauro 2000, p.9). Indeed, as far as the crime team’s casuistry was
concerned, it had to focus on firms active in these areas to find who was behind the
money flows.
Although the large suspicious money flows are most likely related to legal
industries, the money was probably exported illegally. There seem to have been
several cases in Russia in which large amounts of money were embezzled by state
officials and expatriated. While this certainly qualifies as criminal behavior, we
would refrain from calling it “organized crime.” Our reports suggested that the
problem with financial crime in connection to Eastern Europe was not so much one
of “organized crime” in its traditional meaning, but much more an issue of
embezzlement and fraud by “corporate criminals” and bureaucrats. Publications
warning about the “worldwide expansion of the Russian mafiya” do not always
make this distinction.
The problems the money flows from Russia posed for the outside world are
threefold. First, the illegal nature of the money flows affects the integrity of financial
service industries. Second, unknown owners invest in strategic industries in the
West. Third, it perhaps becomes more difficult to distinguish between funds that do
find their origin in criminal activities in Eastern Europe and the “less dirty” money
flows.
25“If all the oil, natural gas, gold, iron, and other metals that Russia produces this year were exported and
sold at the prices prevailing on world markets, Russia would earn around about USD 110 billion. At the
current exchange rate, that is 27 trillion rubles. But, at the rate of output in the first half of this year,
Russia’s total GNP in 1992 will be only 15 trillion rubles. In other words, the raw materials that Russia
digs out of the earth are worth twice as much as every good and service the country produces. How can
this be? Raw-material output is included in GNP. If GNP is the lower of the two numbers, it must be
because industrial enterprises are subtracting, rather than adding, value to the raw materials they consume.
By this measure, the country would be economically better off if every Russian worker, except those in the
country’s mining, oil and transport industries (who would be needed to ship raw materials abroad) simply
stopped working” (The Economist, 25 October 1992, p.69).
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Banditry and mobile banditry
The first threat assessment on Eastern European organized crime published by the
KT NON (1999) established that the vast majority of crimes committed by Eastern
Europeans and registered by the police from 1991 to 1997 involved theft/auto theft
and organized shoplifting. Because the assessment focused on major offences,
“records of criminal offences which may be assumed not to be in any way related to
organized crime,” such as organized shoplifting, were removed from the database
used to analyze the problem (KT NON 1999, pp. 68–69). Only the organized theft of
cars was included in this research. It was determined that this offence was committed
primarily by groups that resided in Eastern Europe. KT NON first mentioned the
existence of organized groups of Polish ram-raiders in the 2000 CBA on Eastern
European organized crime. The 2002 CBA states that there was “every reason to pay
renewed attention” to the area of relatively light offences like theft and burglary (KT
NON 2002, p. 120).
In order to have an adequate view of this kind of crime in the Netherlands, the KT
NON started an intelligence project in October 2003 called the Polaris Project. The
mission was to identify organized mobile gangs by gathering and analyzing
information on relevant incidents and offenders from nine police regions in the
northern and eastern provinces of the Netherlands. The project’s conclusion in July
2005 did not coincide with the end of this crime issue. The Polaris Project final
report (KLPD/DNR 2005) concluded that the activity of mobile gangs from Poland
and Lithuania stabilized and that, in some respects, the scale of activities decreased.
This improvement, however, was not expected to consolidate. This section discusses
some of the findings of the Polaris Project final report.
Under closer scrutiny, Polish and Lithuanian gangs in particular proved to be
involved in more organized forms of relatively light offences. Criminal visitors from
both countries were involved in organized shoplifting, Polish offenders were active
in a series of evening car break-ins and Lithuanians were associated with auto and
lorry thefts and passing counterfeit Euro notes in shops. Offender groups followed a
hit-and-run strategy, committing a series of criminal acts in a short period of time,
before leaving the country with the stolen gains. A general conclusion that can be
drawn from the Polaris report is that in certain regions of several Central and Eastern
European countries, criminal networks form mobile gangs in order to commit
property crimes in the West. In some cases, goods or vehicles are stolen on
assignment. Some gang members even work in salaried employment. A “customer”
or “employer” can generate high profits from a large number of relatively small
criminal offences. The risk of getting caught is small. Local authorities consider
offences to be incidents and do not prioritize them. Even when caught, petty
criminals from abroad are rarely ever prosecuted.
On a European level there is little aggregated knowledge available on this subject. In
its 2004 European Union Organized Crime Report, Europol recognized the potential
threat of organized petty crime and advised that more understanding be gained into this
phenomenon (Europol 2004). In the Netherlands, gangs from Poland and Lithuania
are most prominent, but there have also been groups from the Balkans. In recent
years, Germany and Belgium have been very active in fighting mobile gangs.
Germany established special forces (Bekämpfung Osteuropäische Bandenkriminalität)
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and began working closely together with the local authorities in Central and Eastern
Europe. In addition to Polish and Lithuanian gangs, Germany also deals with groups
from Latvia, Estonia, Belarus and Rumania. In Belgium, one-fifth to one-third of
burglaries and ram-raids are attributed to traveling gangs from a variety of Eastern and
Southeastern European countries. Since 2004, Belgium has prioritized the problem on a
federal level (Federal government of Belgium).
Using two types of police sources, the Polaris report tried to estimate the scale on
which Polish and Lithuanian mobile gangs operate in the Netherlands. First, it
analyzed information on offenders from these countries who were not registered as
residents of the Netherlands and the offences they were charged with. Second, it
focused on the number of offences associated with mobile banditry to see if any
relevant trends could be distinguished. The findings were compared with qualitative
information from the Polaris database, which also included information on active
groups that had not or not yet been arrested.
According to an annually published general analysis of offences and offenders
registered in HKS, in the 1998–2003 period, 5% of all arrested offenders were not
registered as a resident of the Netherlands. Following Western Europeans, non-
resident offenders from Eastern European countries represented the biggest group in
these years. The Polaris report indicated substantial growth in the number of Polish
non-resident offenders, in particular, and—to a lesser extent—of Lithuanian non-
resident offenders. In 1996, 268 non-resident Polish offenders ran afoul of the
Dutch police; by 2004, this number had increased to 1,231 offenders. As far as the
police know, 27% of the 2,147 Polish “criminal visitors” arrested between 1998
and 2003 committed more than one offence and 12% had been arrested more than
once. The 445 Lithuanians reflect a similar picture (37% and 8% respectively).
From October 2003 to December 2005, the Polaris registration counted 2,333
Polish and 845 Lithuanian suspects, the majority of which were reported by nine of
the 26 police regions. Since the Polaris registration system is hardly suitable for
quantitative analysis, these large numbers can only indicate that the HKS numbers
presented above, only offer an impression of the minimum scale of this problem.
The criminal profiles of the registered population of Polish and Lithuanian non-
resident offenders show that the majority of the offences they commit can be categorized
as crimes against property with no use of violence. As mentioned above, HKS data
showed that Polish offenders were mostly involved in shoplifting and car break-ins,
whereas Lithuanians specialized in shoplifting, auto theft and passing counterfeit
money. The Polaris team also gained intelligence on Polish and Romanian mobile
groups specialized in breaking into parkingmeters at night, groups breaking into houses,
groups specialized in pick-pocketing and stealing horse riding gear, boats or outboard
motors.
Some general characteristics can be drawn from Polaris intelligence on 38 different
criminal groups. At the time of arrest, most groups consisted of two to four persons.
Analysis of, for example, telecom data or guest lists of accommodations used by
suspects and, in the case of Lithuanian groups, information about border crossings,
often showed that gangs consisted of several “teams.” The largest group consisted of 25
members who stole from electronics stores; another group had 19 members who
specialized in stealing certain brands of luxury cosmetics. The criminal activities of
mobile groups were often carefully planned. Some shoplifters and counterfeit money
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gang members were recruited through newspaper ads and brought to the Netherlands
where they were equipped with “working cars,” mostly with Dutch or German license
plates. In general, the stolen goods of several “teams” were pooled and sent back to the
home country in one shipment. In some cases, downloaded lists with addresses of shops
or shopping lists with items to steal were found. The police also came across maps of
the Netherlands indicating places to go and what areas had already been covered.
Groups tried to cut costs by sleeping in their cars and stealing gasoline from parked cars
or gasoline stations.
Measuring the material and immaterial damage done to society by mobile banditry is
not an easy task. The Polaris Project final report attempts to do so based on the number
of offences associated with mobile banditry solved. In 2002, 5% of all car break-ins were
solved. In 2003 and 2004, Polish and Lithuanian non-residents were reported to be
involved in 936 car break-ins; roughly 6% of all 15,034 car break-ins solved. Assuming
that the general 5% rate of solving car break-ins is also valid for the Polish and
Lithuanian break-ins, these groups committed 18,041 break-ins.26 If the average
amount of damage done to cars was €500, the total damage would be valued at
€4.5 million. Similar calculations were performed for other offences, bringing the total
material damage to €11.2 million in 2 years’ time.
The Polaris report concluded that the estimated material damage done by
mobile criminal groups does not merit high prioritization. However, it should be
realized that the damage affects a large number of victims. This type of crime
affects citizens in a more direct manner than, for example, drug trafficking or
money laundering.
In the years before Poland and Lithuania joined the EU, the members of
criminal “petty” gangs, who were arrested, were usually deported pursuant to the
Aliens Act. Interviews with Lithuanian law enforcement staff revealed that this
policy actually encouraged rather than discouraged these criminals to come to the
Netherlands. In fact, they were given a free ticket home. Results from the Polaris
project taught that an active law enforcement policy on mobile banditry and the
actual prosecution of gang members have proven to have a deterrent effect on
mobile gangs. The high mobility of this type of crime suggests that pull factors
such as a low experienced risk of being caught have a strong effect on choosing
which country to go to.
Violence
In the early to mid-1990s, the assassination of Eastern European businessmen in the
Netherlands and most certainly also in the Russian Federation, which at the time had
the highest rate of international murder, seemed to confirm the impression that
criminals from the area of attention were particularly violent. Although the number
of suspects in the Netherlands was quite modest, it did not rule out the possibility
that these suspects posed a serious crime problem with respect to violence and other
serious offences.
26This is 6% of the 600,680 reported break-ins in 2003 and 2004.
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HKS statistics indicate that Eastern European criminals in the Netherlands are not
particularly violent. As a matter of fact, in 2002, 6.5–7% of registered crimes
committed by former Soviet and Central European citizens involved violence; the
Dutch average was 10%. Moreover, crimes against property that do not involve
violence are overrepresented for Central and Eastern European suspects and crimes
against property involving violence are underrepresented. The average Dutch
criminal is one-third to almost twice as violent as an Eastern European criminal
visiting the Netherlands.27
During the research period, a total of 13 combinations of suspects were identified
that had been involved in armed robberies; this is a very small fraction of all armed
robberies. The data set also contained 17 combinations that had been involved in
cases of intimidation, blackmail and similar offences. It is probable that the police
are still unaware of many of the incidents. There were cases of extortion of Russian
businessmen in the Netherlands by a Chechen gang. In addition, asylum seekers and
seasonal workers were sometimes confronted with similar problems. The expansion
of legal work opportunities after 2004 will probably lead to a decrease in
opportunities for extortion and racketeering with regard to seasonal work.
“Crime without frontiers” presents data regarding cases of murder and manslaughter
committed from 2002 to 2003, in which either the victims or the offenders were from the
area of attention. Out of a total of some 200 cases of murder and manslaughter in the
Netherlands a year, 21 cases have links to the area of attention. Most of these cases were
pretty low profile; 24 victims were counted. In eight out of the 21 cases, there was some
link to illegal markets, but—with the exception of two—they probably did not involve
wholesale trade. In 2003, there was a major case related to the illegal market for
amphetamines involving a Chechen suspect who killed three business partners. The man
was arrested and is now serving a life sentence. Another relevant case, also in 2003,
involved the brutal murder of a Lithuanian man with ties to the synthetic drugs trade.
This case involved an identifiable criminal group with ties to its homeland.
As the team on Central and Eastern European crime was established largely in
response to the assassinations of Russian businessmen, it is interesting to see that
such assassinations in the Netherlands all but stopped by 1999. The assassinations of
the 1990s have never been solved, but investigations have suggested that they were
related to racketeering in the Russian Federation, where buying protection (krysha or
roof) from criminal groups or from elements of the state apparatus had become
standard practice. The absence of new high profile murder cases in the Netherlands
can probably be explained by the fact that in Russia, after almost a decade of “wild”
transition to a market economy, the spoils have now been divided.
All things considered, the findings suggested that cases of murder or
manslaughter involving victims or offenders from the area of attention generally
concerned incidents that could not be related to wholesale trading on illegal markets.
27Police intelligence data do not suggest that Eastern European criminals are overrepresented in serious
crimes, but we have no detailed data on this issue. The Reference Index for Criminal Investigations
(VROS) contains data on natural persons involved in serious crime and data taken from criminal
investigation information. The data set is as confidential as it could be useful, and we only received totals
for such broad categories as “Eastern Europe” and “Southeastern Europe”, the borders of which did not
match our own. The data confirm our findings drawn from HKS data that criminals from the latter region
are more often involved in serious crime than criminals from the area of attention.
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More specifically, the data on murder cases so far do not indicate the presence of a
“Russian mafia” trying to gain a foothold in the Dutch upperworld/underworld.
There was, however, some reason for concern regarding the activities of Lithuanian
gangsters. The team had no cases demonstrating that large “criminal organizations”
from the Russian Federation were active in the Netherlands.
Conclusion
Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, the Netherlands, like other Western European countries,
has noted an increase in the number of criminals from Central and Eastern Europe. In
1999, the KT NON concluded that the problem was “serious, but limited” (KT NON
1999), a conclusion largely confirmed by follow-up studies. As the problem was almost
non-existent during the Cold War, it could only be expected to grow.
When looking at the countries that “supplied” a relatively large number of suspects,
Poland, Russia and Lithuania lead the list, followed by the Ukraine, Armenia,
Azerbaijan and Georgia. Striking is that six of the eight new Member States, which
joined the EU in 2004, have not “supplied” a large number of criminals. The “supply
rates” of the 20 countries of the area of attention differ greatly. The relative shares in the
total numbers of suspects in the Netherlands remain limited to around 1% for Poles and
1% for suspects from the successor states of the former Soviet Union.
Could growth in the number of suspects and immigrant communities enable
criminals from the area of attention to gain a stronger foothold within the Netherlands
over time? No certainty can be given here, but we found that in the case of crime from
this region, ethnicity seems to play a much smaller role than in the case of say, criminals
from Turkey or China. In so far Central and Eastern European criminals become
entrenched in Dutch society, this does not concern their ethnicity, but the ethnically
heterogeneous environment of certain criminal markets.We see no reason to expect that
this pattern will change in the foreseeable future.
Crime from Central and Eastern Europe proved difficult to classify using traditional
approaches to “organized crime.” Organized crime in the sphere of wholesale trading
on illegal markets was only observed to a very limited extent. Mobile banditry is
arguably the most serious manifestation of crime from post-communist countries and
also the one that can only be tackled by a tailored approach that takes cross-border
mobility into account. Corporate crime in the sphere of capital flight and money
laundering is another phenomenon typical of post-communist crime. This problem is
difficult to fight because so little is known as of the owners of flight capital. It can be
said, however, that most money flows probably have no relation to Russian “organized
crime” in the traditional meaning of the word.
We therefore tend to conclude that there is no Russian mafia in the Netherlands.28
This might come as a surprise, at least for those who tend to treat seriously the idea
28After extensive review of US police sources, Finckenauer and Waring (1998) reached the same
conclusion for the USA: “Our conclusion—which may be startling to some—is that the Russian organized
crime in America widely known as the Russian Mafia is first, not Russian; second, not a Mafia; and third,
not even organized crime. Russkaya mafiya? Nyet!” (p.254). Cf. Siegel (2002) who also observes that
westerners often simply think that all Russian citizens are Russian, while many of them are not ethnically
Russian.
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that this mafia is an expansionist entity, like the assessments of the CIA and Galeotti
quoted in the introduction. The crime team most certainly did not find the “national
prefect of the Russian mafiya in the Low Countries” that Galeotti observed. This is
not to deny that crime is a major problem in former communist countries and the
Russian Federation in particular. What we do suggest, however, is that one should be
very careful in suggesting that this problem is exported to the outside world.
Manifestations of crime that have been regarded as characteristic of the “Russian
mafiya,” such as racketeering and financial crimes, probably originate from internal
conditions. The large-scale institutional overhaul that the post-communist transition
has involved and the dire straits communism left these societies in gave rise to these
conditions. If this is correct, the implication might be that, first, some aspects of
post-communist criminality are temporary by nature as they are a side effect of
transition, and, second, that the internationalization of post-communist crime cannot
be taken for granted since the “opportunities” in transitional economies are very
different from those found in the West.
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